The situation in Iran

For some leftist coverage of the situation in Iran, check out:
http://www.revleft.com/vb/iranian-uprising-f235/index.html

It appears to be a very complicated situation there. I do not think the time has yet arrived for unbridled giddiness. As I see it, the acting groups of the situation are:
*Ahmadinejad & co.
*The clerical establishment
*Moussavi & co.
*Average people who are Moussavi supporters
*Other average people who are understandably dissatisfied with the Iranian regime, but who do not support Moussavi
*The U.S. (incl. CIA interference)
*People being paid off by the CIA to contribute to the destabilization of the country.

For the first two groups, the Iranian uprising is a hindrance rather than an opportunity. Ahmadinejad & co. will want to hold onto power at all costs, though, whereas I could see the clerical establishment being willing to cut a deal with Moussavi & co. if it is deemed to be worth it. Moussavi, after all, is no direct opponent to this clerical establishment, just some of its more hardline cultural policies. I would expect very little change in Iranian foreign policy, for example, if Moussavi were to attain power with the clerical establishment intact (and perhaps even without the clerical establishment intact). Iran will still be pursuing a nuclear program. Iran will also still probably be supporting Hezbollah and Hamas. The only difference might be a little more willingness to receive direct investment from the West.

For the rest of the groups, the uprising is an opportunity. Not an unconditionally positive thing, for the uprising may yet still take a turn against their particular favor, but an opportunity. They each want different things.

Moussavi & co. want power.

Many Moussavi supporters started out just wanting a re-do of the election so that they could get a legitimate chance of getting their favorite, Moussavi, into power. But many have become rapidly disillusioned with the whole clerical establishment by the recent events, and many of this group are now calling for the outright abolition of that establishment. Moussavi & co. are not quite comfortable with this, for I'm sure they expected to be able to lean on the familiar clerical establishment for support once in power, and even worse, the abolition of the clerical establishment would give an opening to more radical groups and a radicalization of their own supporters that could threaten Moussavi & co.'s chances for power. That is something that Moussavi & co. do not want. So Moussavi & co. have in the past few days been trying to get out in front of the demands of their supporters (by belatedly calling for more radical tactics and appearing to take some initiative, whereas in reality it is Moussavi & co. who are being led), reaffirm their credentials, and corral their supporters' aspirations into tamer demands.

Other people who are dissatisfied with the Iranian regime, but who do not support Moussavi, have been some of the most radical elements in the uprising so far. This is where the chants of "Death to the Dictator" and the anti-clerical language have mostly arisen at first. However, this group is itself internally diverse. It includes communists of MANY MANY feuding sub-types (as usual), in addition to culturally-radical students and others who are just disillusioned with the entire system after perceiving the election as a complete fraud (which, by the way, I'm not even going to touch upon the issue of whether the election was really a fraud or not, but by this point, that no longer really matters. The uprising, in general, has moved beyond that issue). It is this group that has jumped on this unprecedented opening to call for systemic change that I would "support" during the ongoing uprising, and it is the existence of this group that makes me conclude that the uprising does have some worth and is, in general, worth defending against the crackdowns of the ruling regime, despite the unquestionable existence of...

U.S. interference. Although the U.S. would not have much to gain by supporting any one faction in this uprising (for example, I do not think that the U.S. is really trying to foment another "color revolution" in favor of Moussavi because that would not really help the U.S. much on the all-important foreign policy front...the U.S. would like to topple the Ahmadinejad regime, but only in favor of a much more docile puppet, rather than a homegrown nationalist reformer), I am still sure that the U.S. is using this uprising as an opportunity to foment general disorder even more, considering that it has had existing destablilization covert ops projects enabled against Iran since at least 2006, and I have seen nothing to suggest that the U.S. has since discontinued these projects. The ideal outcome for U.S. stabilization efforts is to have this uprising end in a stalemate that ends up weakening Iran internally over the long term. An outright Moussavi victory might be a slight victory for the U.S. efforts, but not much. The worst case scenario for the U.S. would be the victory of communist forces that would maintain economic and military nationalism, but would diffuse domestic tensions by abolishing the religious establishment and by reforming cultural practices and rectifying economic inequality.

So, I am sure that some component of the uprising consists of U.S. lackeys. However, unlike others who have been trying to paint this entire uprising as one big staged spectacle in the service of U.S. imperialism, I think this is a small element that does not define the overall character of the Iranian uprising. Therefore, in conversation, my position would be to support the Iranian revolution, and especially to acknowledge the existence of, and support, the most radical elements. That said, even a Moussavi victory would be a slightly progressive change (although we should have no illusions about the fact that Moussavi will crack down upon leftists in order to end the uprising and put to rest the more radical aspriations, if/when he gets into power, so in that sense, I will probably never "support," Moussavi, even though I would have to acknowledge that his victory would take Iran in a more progressive direction, which would be a comparatively good thing. Not supporting Moussavi, despite this good aspect of his, has to do with the ethical imperative of not being implicated, in even the remotest sense, in the suppression of leftist forces, I suppose).